COMMON SENSE INSTITUTE

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ESTATE TAXES, MIGRATING 65+ POPULATION, AND THE MONEY WE LEAVE BEHIND

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT TO OREGON

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Mark McMullen brings a wealth of expertise to CSI, having served as the longest-tenured Chief Economist for the State of Oregon under three governors. Serving under a fourth governor as interim Chief Economist his first year, Mark accumulated 14 years of invaluable experience in the governor's office. Before joining CSI, Mark held prominent roles, including Director of Consulting at Moody's Analytics and researcher at the Congressional Budget Office. He earned his undergraduate degree from Pomona College and completed his graduate studies at the University of Pennsylvania.

Serra Kirsch recently earned a Master of Science in Economics from Portland State University, where she I specialized in empirical macroeconomics and international finance. Before that, she I spent two years conducting research in health economics, focusing on the impact of tobacco control policies. she completed he undergraduate education in Industrial Engineering and Economics in Istanbul, Turkey.

Growing up in Istanbul, she I developed a strong interest in working on emerging market economies. In her free time, she enjoys rock climbing and scuba diving.

Thomas Young, Ph.D. brings a wealth of experience at the touch points of economics including economic forecasting, public policy and public finance, econometrics, investing, survey research, and cost-benefit analyses to name a few. He received his Ph.D. in Business Economics, Industrial Organization, Econometrics, and Finance from the University of Utah. Thomas currently lives in Salt Lake City, Utah with his wife and four wonderful daughters.

ABOUT COMMON SENSE INSTITUTE

Common Sense Institute is a non-partisan research organization dedicated to the protection and promotion of Oregon's economy. CSI is at the forefront of important discussions concerning the future of free enterprise and aims to have an impact on the issues that matter most to Oregonians. CSI's mission is to examine the fiscal impacts of policies, initiatives, and proposed laws so that Oregonians are educated and informed on issues impacting their lives. CSI employs rigorous research techniques and dynamic modeling to evaluate the potential impact of these measures on the Oregon economy and individual opportunity.

TEAMS & FELLOWS STATEMENT

CSI is committed to independent, in-depth research that examines the impacts of policies, initiatives, and proposed laws so that Oregonians are educated and informed on issues impacting their lives. CSI's commitment to institutional independence is rooted in the individual independence of our researchers, economists, and fellows. At the core of CSI's mission is a belief in the power of the free enterprise system. Our work explores ideas that protect and promote jobs and the economy, and the CSI team and fellows take part in this pursuit with academic freedom. Our team's work is informed by data-driven research and evidence. The views and opinions of fellows do not reflect the institutional views of CSI. CSI operates independently of any political party and does not take positions.

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SUMMARY

When it comes to estate taxes, levies that also are often referred to as death taxes, Oregon has the lowest exemption threshold and the third highest tax rate.

While any changes to the structure and scope of this tax would impact state revenue and the availability of it for state government spending, policy shifts also could affect individuals' and business owners' decisions to live and operate in Oregon. This statement is especially true for people over the age of 65.

Common Sense Institute (CSI) modeling suggests that if the state were at least allow the estate tax exemption to account for inflation, home values, or some other metric, it could have a beneficial impact on the state by encouraging more people to live, start businesses, and retire here.

KEY FINDINGS

- Oregon's estate tax collections have more than tripled over the past decade.
  - > Oregon is one of 12 states with an estate tax.
  - > The state has the lowest exemption threshold and third highest estate tax rate.
  - > The number of people paying estate taxes is growing faster than the population. At current growth rates by 2050, the number of estate tax returns will increase 282% relative to the number of returns in 2022. Over that same time horizon, the total population is expected to grow only 20%. The number of Oregon residents over age 65 is expected to increase 46%.
- The number of deaths subject to estate tax liability is expected to more than double over the coming 25 years, from 5% today to 12% in 2050.
- Currently, Oregon's exemption threshold, set at $1 million, is fixed, meaning it does not grow relative to incomes, inflation, or any other metric. If the threshold had been allowed to automatically increase from year to year, estate tax liability would be much lower. Indexing since 2002, for example, would have resulted in a threshold of:
  - > $1.8 million if indexed to consumer price;
  - > $3.1 million if indexed to home values; or
  - > $5.2 million if indexed to the S&P 500.
- Modeling results suggest the state's relatively high estate tax has kept people aged 65 and over from staying, or moving to, Oregon.
- According to CSI's modeling, phasing out the estate tax would eventually equate to:
  - > 116,000 more individuals living in Oregon;
  - > 54,000 more employed individuals in Oregon;
  - > 35,000 more individuals in the labor force;
  - > An extra $11.3 billion in GDP; and
  - > An additional $19.2 billion in sales, output.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Oregon is one of only 12 U.S. states that impose an estate tax[i] on top of the federal estate tax. Oregon's tax also is one of the most burdensome in the country. The exemption rate is set low and is fixed and the tax itself is assessed at relatively high rates. Specifically, Oregon imposes a tax on estates valued at $1 million or more. For the 2024 tax year, rates ranged from 10% to 16% depending on an estate's value. The tax is calculated based on the portion of the estate that exceeds the $1 million exemption[ii].
The 2024 tax rates were:

- $1 million to $1.5 million: 10%
- $1.5 million to $2.5 million: 10.25% to 10.5%
- $2.5 million to $3.5 million: 11% to 11.5%
- $3.5 million to $4.5 million: 12% to 12.5%
- $4.5 million to $5.5 million: 13% to 13.5%
- $5.5 million to $6.5 million: 14% to 14.5%
- $6.5 million to $7.5 million: 15% to 15.5%
- Over $7.5 million: 16%.

The estate tax provides General Fund resources, but over time Oregon's system has become increasingly out of sync with the federal estate tax and other state systems. As Table 1 shows, Oregon has the lowest exemption threshold and the third highest maximum tax rate.

TABLE 1.1[iii]

State Estate Tax Rates and Exemptions (As of January 1, 2025)		
State	**Exemption**	**Rate (Min. to Max.)**
Conn. (a)	$13,990,000	12%
Hawaii	$5,490,000	10.0% - 20.0%
Ill.	$4,000,000	0.8% - 16.0%
Maine	$7,000,000	8.0% - 12.0%
Md. (b)	$5,000,000	0.8% - 16.0%
Mass.	$2,000,000	0.8% - 16.0%
Minn.	$3,000,000	13.0% - 16.0%
N.Y. (c)	$7,160,000	3.06% - 16.0%
Ore.	$1,000,000	10.0%-16.0%
R.I.	$1,802,431	0.8% - 16.0%
Vt.	$5,000,000	16.00%
Wash.	$2,193,000	10.0% - 20.0%
D.C.	$4,873,200	11.2% - 16.0%
(a) Connecticut's exclusion matches the federal threshold as of January 1, 2023. Estate tax is currently capped at $15 million.		
(b) Maryland has both an estate and an inheritance tax. See Table 37.		
(c) New York has a cliff at 105% of the exemption amount, after which the exemption no longer applies.		

OREGON ESTATE TAX COLLECTIONS

As Figure 1 shows, Oregon's estate tax collections have more than tripled over the past biennium, increasing from $102 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 to $339 million in FY 2024. Should this trend persist, revenue from the estate tax will reach $471 million by FY 2030.

Prior to this surge, estate tax collections had been relatively stable for many years — around $100 million per year. Although the number of deaths in Oregon has risen over the past decade, this factor alone cannot explain the growth. The increase is at least somewhat attributable to the fact that the exemption level is fixed. A larger share of estates now fall above Oregon's taxable threshold. Indeed, a significant factor in the growth of overall collections has been large gains in net worth among Oregon's wealthiest households so that more and more residents are subject to the 16% top rate. (Wealthy filers derive a much larger share of their net worth from by stocks, business income, and other investment instruments, all of which have been on an extended bull run in recent years.) Although these filers are few in number, they account for nearly one-third of overall estate tax collections.

FIGURE 1



FIGURE 2


Percent Growth in Estate Tax Returns and Percent Growth in 65+ and Total Population Relative to 2022
Percentage growth in estate tax returns relative to 2022
Percentage growth in population
Percentage growth in 65+ population
300%
200%
100%
0%
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
282%
46%
20%
Source: CSI Research and Modeling, Portland State University, Oregon Legislature

WHO PAYS OREGON'S ESTATE TAX?

In Oregon, the estate tax is imposed on estates valued $1 million or more. As Figure 3 shows, when measured by count of returns, the largest group of estate taxpayers fall within the group of estates valued between $1 to $1.5 million. In 2022, there were 1,012 such returns, making up 46% of all estate tax filers.

Not all tax filers end up owing the estate tax. Estates passed on to a spouse are not taxable, for example, nor are estates that are passed on as charitable contributions. Also, farm and natural resource assets are largely exempt from the Oregon estate tax.

Excluding filers who did not owe tax, estates valued between $1 to $1.5 million made up 32% of filers.

FIGURE 3

Count of Oregon Estate Tax Returns, 2017-2022

When measured by number of returns received for the estate tax, the largest group of estate taxpayers includes returns between $1-$1.5 million (1,012 in 2022), between $1.5-$2.5 million (656 in 2022), and $2.5-$3.5 million (237 in 2022).



Source: Oregon Legislature

FIGURE 4



As Figure 4 and Figure 5 show, when measured by the share of estate tax collections, the estate tax is top heavy. Indeed, 32% of 2022 tax payments stemmed from the small group of filers with estates valued at $9.5 million or more.

FIGURE 5

Tax Year 2022 - Oregon Estate Tax Returns

Taxable Estate Value	Number of Estates	Num of Returns as % of total	Payable Tax	Tax as % of total
Under $1M	888	29		0
$1M-$1.5M	1012	33	17,426,667	5
$1.5M-$2.5M	656	21	57,759,652	18
$2.5M-$3.5M	237	8	42,334,036	13
$3.5M-$4.5M	98	3	25,633,754	8
$4.5M-$5.5M	59	2	22,674,259	7
$5.5M-$6.5M	36	1	15,509,496	5
$6.5M-$7.5M	28	1	13,841,493	4
$7.5M-$9.5M	38	1	24,880,930	8
more than $9.5M	54	2	103,889,644	32
total	3106	100	323,949,931	100

Source: Oregon's Legislative Revenue Office -2025 OREGON PUBLIC FINANCE: BASIC FACTS • Most Oregonians do not need to file an estate tax return, as the total number of deaths in the state is significantly higher than the 3,106 estate tax filings recorded in this data. The 888 estates listed under "Under $1M" represent cases where a return was filed but no estate tax was due.

WHO WILL PAY OREGON'S ESTATE TAX IN THE FUTURE?

Not only is Oregon's estate tax exemption threshold low relative to other states, it is fixed, meaning that it remains unchanged over time.

Since the threshold does not adjust for rising inflation and growing wealth, as Figure 6 on the next page shows, Oregon's estate tax will capture an increasingly large portion of the population over time. Using estimates for projected deaths and number of estate tax returns, at current trends, the number of deaths subject to the estate tax will grow by 282% from 2022 through 2050, with the percentage of deaths subject to the estate tax growing from 5% in 2022 to 12% by 2050.

FIGURE 6



WHAT GENERATES ESTATE TAX LIABILITY?

Oregon's estate tax return requires filers to itemize the composition of their estates, a mandate that allowed CSI to trace the sources of tax liability. As Figure 7 on the next page shows, sources of liability differ greatly across tax brackets. For example, real estate values per filer are larger for each bracket between $2.5 million to $7.5 million than they are for filers in the top tax bracket who report taxable estates larger than $9.5 million.

FIGURE 7



Source: Oregon Department of Revenue

INFLATION-ADJUSTING THE ESTATE TAX THRESHOLD

Oregon's current $1 million estate tax exemption threshold became effective for decedents' estates beginning in 2002[iv]. Since 2002, the value of the median home in Oregon has risen 211%, the value of the S&P 500 has increased 419%, and consumer prices have risen 80%.

As mentioned previously, because Oregon's estate tax rate is fixed, an increasing number of decedents will be subject to this levy.

Indexing the estate tax exemption amount to some metric like inflation or home values would slow the number of residents subject to the tax. For example, as Figure 8 on the next page shows, if the current $1 million threshold had been allowed to automatically increase from year to year starting in 2002, it would have resulted in thresholds of:

- $1.8 million if indexed to consumer price;
- $3.1 million if indexed to home values; or
- $5.2 million if indexed to the S&P 500.

FIGURE 8



HOW THE ESTATE TAX AFFECTS STATE REVENUE

If Oregon lawmakers were to raise the estate tax exemption threshold or lower rates, the state would likely see reduced revenues to the General Fund — at least in the near term. Had the threshold been indexed to the inflation since 2002, for example, collections would have been $223 million, or about 31% lower than actual collections in 2022. (These predictions do not account for any dynamic impact from more retired individuals moving or staying in the state because of lower taxes, however, a factor that may have mitigated revenue losses).

About 75% of the approximately $101 million tax cut (on a static basis) would have gone to smaller estates valued at less than $3.5 million. (It should be noted, however that a higher exemption threshold would have lowered taxable net worth for individuals in all tax brackets, not only those who would no longer owe taxes.)

Booming estate tax collections also have contributed to generating a larger kicker credit in recent years. Notably, a filer's estate tax payments do not directly impact the size of an individual filer's kicker credit. The credit is allocated according to income tax liability, not other payments dedicated to the General Fund, even though these payments are included when assessing the overall size of the rebate.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT

Do individuals who may soon be subject to Oregon's estate tax choose to leave the state in order to avoid paying the levy? While there are avenues to mitigate estate tax liability, including establishing family trusts, a large anticipated estate tax bill may tip the scales for households considering relocation anyway. CSI modeled the impact on migration using annual estimates of age group populations by state from 1980 to 2023[v]. The result of the simple panel regression indicate states with an estate or inheritance tax are missing, on average, 8,732 individuals aged 65 and over compared to states without an estate or inheritance tax. This finding suggests Oregon's estate tax may be incentivizing elderly individuals to relocate to states with lower or no estate taxes, potentially leading to broader economic consequences.

A study from 2004[vi] also provides strong empirical evidence that **high state estate taxes significantly reduce the number of high-net-worth elderly individuals residing in states**. This research, which analyzed federal estate tax return data from **1965 to 1998,** found **a one percentage point increase in a state's estate and inheritance tax rate led to a 1.4% to 2.7% decline in the number of federal estate tax returns filed in that state.** For estates valued at more than $5 million, the number of federal estate tax returns filed in a state declined by nearly 4% for each one-percentage-point increase in the estate and inheritance tax rate. These findings are in line with CSI's regression results, suggesting Oregon's estate tax structure is likely contributing to the outmigration of retirees.

Additionally, tax-related migration behavior is not unique to estate taxes. A relevant study conducted in 2010[vii] regarding **property taxes and elderly mobility** found tax burdens significantly influence relocation decisions. This research determined a **$100 increase in annual property taxes leads to a 0.73 percentage point increase in the two-year mobility rate of homeowners over the age of 50,** representing an **8% increase from the baseline mobility rate.** This finding suggests tax-related financial burdens, whether ongoing like property taxes or one-time like estate taxes, can have a measurable effect on migration.

Although **property and estate taxes operate differently,** both contribute to the financial considerations of older individuals. Property taxes impose a continuous cost while estate taxes affect the wealth transfer decisions of high-net-worth individuals. Still, both create incentives for relocation. If elderly homeowners respond to relatively small property tax increases by moving, they may be even more likely to relocate if an estate tax could significantly impact their heirs. Given that, at $1 million, Oregon has the lowest estate tax exemption threshold and the third highest tax rate — again rates are set between 10% and 16% —the state may be experiencing a migration effect similar to that observed in the 2010 property tax study.

By applying this framework, the outmigration of older individuals in Oregon may not just be a result of estate tax liability at the time of death, but also **a proactive decision to relocate before their estates become taxable,** similar to how elderly homeowners respond to property tax burdens. This determination reinforces the argument that Oregon's estate tax policy may be contributing to outmigration of the state's older population.

TABLE 2

Age 65 and over	Coef.	St.Err.	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf	Interval]	Sig
L1.	1.032	.001	1255.22	0	1.031	1.034	***
Has Estate Inher Tx	-8.732	.672	-13.00	0	-10.048	-7.416	***
Constant	-.763	1.18	-0.65	.518	-3.075	1.549	

Mean dependent var	665.664	**SD dependent var**	747.275
Overall r-squared	1.000	**Number of obs**	2193
Chi-square	1853391.097	**Prob > chi2**	0.000
R-squared within	0.998	**R-squared between**	1.000

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

To further check elderly taxpayers' migration, CSI performed a Lasso regression that included fixed effects for each state and their temperature (acknowledging states with milder climates attract retirees).

Double-selection linear model

Number of obs	= 2,200
Number of controls	= 51
Number of selected controls	= 50
Wald chi2(1)	= 918.20
Prob > chi2	= 0.0000

TABLE 3

Age 65 and over	Coefficient	std. err.	z	Pr.	[95% conf. interval]
Has EstateInher Tx	-0.027	0.001	-30.3	0	-0.029

Note: Chi-squared test is a Wald test of the coefficients of the variables of interest jointly equal to zero. Lassos select controls for model estimation.

The -0.027 result shown in Table 3 suggests states with estate or inheritance taxes generally have 2.7% fewer individuals aged 65 and over as a percent of the population. Converting the 2.7% to the number of individuals aged 65 and over equates to 120,000 individuals, a much higher number than the 8,732 estimate provided in the previous section. To be conservative on the impact, we used the 8,732. Interestingly, the results in Table 3 closely corroborate the economic impact results estimated using REMI in the following section.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT FROM THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT

Individuals aged 65 and over generate economic activity. Using Regional Economic Models Incorporated's (REMI) dynamic multiplier system, CSI estimated the economic impact of the missing 8,732 individuals. As Figure 9 shows, by 2035 losing these retires would result in:

- 125,000 fewer people in Oregon;
- 59,000 fewer employed individuals in Oregon;
- 39,000 fewer people in the labor force;
- A $6.3 billion reduction in GDP; and
- A $10.5 billion reduction in sales, or output.

FIGURE 9



COMBINING THE REVENUE IMPACT AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT

Estate tax collections allow the state to provide additional public services. This benefit becomes smaller as households may leaving the state to avoid the tax. Over time, as more households are impacted by the estate tax and their tax bills grow, outmigration is likely to increase further eroding the impact of the revenue gains.

CSI input these two effects into the REMI model to get a sense of the net economic benefit. First, a reduction in static government spending by the amount of the estate tax and growing by 10% in each year thereafter, and second, an increase in the initial population aged 65 and over by 8,732.

As Figure 10 shows, by 2035 the two forces combined would result in:

- 116,000 more individuals in Oregon;
- 54,000 more employed individuals in Oregon;
- 35,000 more individuals in the labor force;
- $11.3 billion in additional GDP; and
- $19.2 billion in additional sales, output.

FIGURE 10



These findings indicate that **estate tax-related migration may have a compounding effect on Oregon's economic growth** consistent with the 2004 and 2010 studies on the estate and inheritance taxes and property taxes that were cited above. While research on property taxes demonstrates targeted tax relief programs such as homestead exemptions and property tax freezes can slow out-migration and help to retain older populations, studies on estate and inheritance taxes provide direct evidence that **high-net-worth individuals relocate to avoid such taxes.** Indeed, as discussed previously, the 2004 study determined **states with higher estate tax rates experienced a measurable decline in the number of elderly individuals filing federal estate tax returns, suggesting a direct link between estate tax burdens and migration.**

Oregon's estate tax currently generates revenue for the state, but at the potential cost of long-term economic growth. If high-net-worth individuals choose to relocate to avoid estate taxes, **the state may forgo other tax revenues, particularly from personal income taxes, as well as from the economic activity driven by these individuals' spending, investment, and local business engagement.**

Adjusting Oregon's estate tax exemption threshold could **help mitigate this migration effect, retain retirees, and preserve the state's broader economic stability.** While the static fiscal impact of proposed estate tax reforms will result in a reduction in state revenue, the **broader economic gains — both in terms of retained population and increased economic activity — may offset this revenue loss over time.** Adjusting Oregon's estate tax policy could **limit tax-induced migration and support long-term economic growth.**

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

First enacted in 1903[viii], Oregon has changed its inheritance and estate tax numerous times. Prior to 1978, the tax was calculated as a variable percentage of the taxable estate value, depending on the size of the transfer and the beneficiary's relationship to the decedent. In 1977, the legislature simplified the tax structure, setting a flat 12% rate on net taxable estate value for all beneficiaries and initiating a gradual repeal. By January 1, 1987, the statutory inheritance tax rate was reduced to zero, leaving only what was referred to as the "pick-up tax," which matched the maximum state inheritance tax credit allowed under federal law. This mechanism ensured Oregon could impose an inheritance tax on residents without increasing the overall tax burden.

The 2001 federal Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) significantly altered estate tax laws, including phasing out the state tax credit. This provision eliminated states' ability to claim a portion of federal estate tax liability by 2005. In response, in 2003 Oregon passed HB 3072, tying its estate tax laws to the Internal Revenue Code as of December 31, 2000. From 2003 to 2011, Oregon's filing requirements diverged from federal rules, sometimes requiring estates to file state returns even when a federal return was unnecessary.

Efforts to protect family-owned farms, fishing businesses, and small forests led to passage of HB 3201 in 2007. This legislation increased the filing threshold for these estates to $7.5 million. However, implementation proved challenging, leading to a revised credit schedule for small family-owned natural resource properties in 2008. This credit also faced implementation challenges leading the state to enact a similar exemption in 2023.

In 2012, HB 2541 restructured Oregon's inheritance tax into the current system. The 2012 legislation included a credit for natural resource properties. In 2015, SB 864 refined the Natural Resource Credit, ensuring qualification was based solely on property within Oregon. To qualify, at least 50% of the Oregon-adjusted gross estate value must consist of natural resource property. Some property owners have had difficulty qualifying for the NRC. This problem led policymakers to enact a Natural Resource Exemption, SB 498 in 2023, which makes qualifying for the tax credit easier for some residents.

Estate tax reform has received significant attention during the 2025 General Session, but, as of late March 2025, no bills have been moved out of committee.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Oregon's estate tax collections have surged, providing significant support to the General Fund. At the same time, the tax is an outlier relative to other states.

The bigger the difference in tax systems across areas, the larger the incentive becomes for some taxpayers to change their behavior to reduce what they owe. In the case of Oregon's estate taxes, the primary economic distortion of concern is that older households will choose to leave the state. Oregon has seen this problem before. Washington state does not have a broad income tax and year after year, Oregon has lost population to Washington.

Although there has been little evidence that Oregon's estate tax has resulted in large population outflows to date, the state is now in uncharted territory. Estate tax liability is larger than ever before and will continue to grow rapidly going forward.

Estate taxes also do not exist in a vacuum. They are only one part of Oregon's overall tax system. High-income households have seen their tax bills increase significantly because the top rate of the state's income tax, like the estate tax threshold, is fixed. Over time, more income has become subject to the highest rate. Also, localities have imposed substantial taxes on high-income households. A large estate tax bill could be the final straw for many households, leading them to leave the state.

APPENDIX

The 2024 Oregon estate tax[ix] computation (Part 2, which comes after Part 1 containing information about the decedent and the executor) begins with the gross value of the estate (line 1). The estate tax allows for deductions (line 2), a natural resource exemption (line e) and an allocation based on the portion of the estate located in Oregon (line 7). The estate tax also allows for credits (lines 9 and 10).

FIGURE 11

Include a copy of all required schedules and supporting documents.

Part 2—Tax computation

1. Total gross estate (from page 3, part 5, line 512)	● 1.	.00
2. Total allowable deductions (from page 3, part 5, line 522)	● 2.	.00
3. Natural resource property exemption (include Schedule OR-NRE, see instructions)	● 3.	.00
4. Taxable estate (line 1 minus lines 2 and 3, if applicable)	● 4.	.00
5. Oregon estate tax (see instructions, part 6, for tax table)	● 5.	.00
6. Gross value of property located in Oregon (see instructions)	● 6.	.00
7. Oregon percentage (see instructions)	● 7.	. %
8. Tax payable to Oregon (line 5 multiplied by line 7)	● 8.	.00
9. Natural Resource Credit (from Schedule OR-NRC, line 12)	● 9.	.00
10. Forest Conservation Tax Credit (see instructions)	● 10.	.00
11. Net estate tax (line 8 minus lines 9 and 10)	● 11.	.00
12. Amount paid by original due date of return (see instructions)	● 12.	.00
13. Tax due. Is line 11 more than line 12? If so, line 11 minus line 12	● 13.	.00
14. **Overpayment.** Is line 12 more than line 11? If so, line 12 minus line 11	● 14.	.00
15. Penalty for late filing or late payment (see instructions)	● 15.	.00
16. Interest on late payment (see instructions)	● 16.	.00
17. **Total due** (add lines 13, 15, and 16)	● 17.	.00
18. **Refund** (line 14 minus lines 15 and 16)	● 18.	.00

Signature and authorization: Under penalties of false swearing, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements. To the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. If prepared by a person other than the executor, this declaration is based on all information of which the preparer has any knowledge.

Executor signature	Date	Executor phone
X	/ /	( ) –
Title	**Executor SSN**	**Executor FEIN**
	– –	–

The main components of the estate tax are reported in Part 5, detailing assets and deductions making up the estate[x]. The gross estate includes the values for ownership in real estate, stocks, bonds, mortgages, insurance, jointly owned property, other miscellaneous property, transfers during the decedent's life, powers of appointment, and annuities (Figure 11). Deductions include funeral expenses, property expenses, debts, mortgages and liens, net losses, bequests to surviving spouse, and bequests to charitable, public, and other similar gifts (Figure 12).

FIGURE 12

Part 5—Recapitulation

Gross estate

			(a) Alternate value	(b) Value at date of death
501.	Schedule A—Real estate	501.	.00	.00
502.	Schedule B—Stocks and bonds	502.	.00	.00
503.	Schedule C—Mortgages, notes, and cash	503.	.00	.00
504.	Schedule D—Insurance on the decedent's life [include Form(s) 712]	504.	.00	.00
505.	Schedule E—Jointly owned property	505.	.00	.00
506.	Schedule F—Other miscellaneous property	506.	.00	.00
507.	Schedule G—Transfers during decedent's life	507.	.00	.00
508.	Schedule H—Powers of appointment	508.	.00	.00
509.	Schedule I—Annuities	509.	.00	.00
510.	Total gross estate (add lines 501 through 509)	510.	.00	.00
511.	Schedule U—Qualified conservation easement exclusion	511.	.00	.00
512.	**Total gross estate less exclusion** (line 510 minus line 511). Enter here and on part 2, line 1	512.	.00	.00

Deductions

			Amount
513.	Schedule J—Funeral expenses and expense incurred in administering property subject to claims	513.	.00
514.	Schedule K—Debts of the decedent	514.	.00
515.	Schedule K—Mortgages and liens	515.	.00
516.	Total of lines 513 through 515	516.	.00
517.	Allowable amount of deductions from line 516 (see instructions)	517.	.00
518.	Schedule L—Net losses during administration	518.	.00
519.	Schedule L—Expenses incurred in administering property not subject to claims	519.	.00
520.	Schedule M—Bequests, etc., to surviving spouse (see instructions) or Oregon Schedule OR-OSMP	520.	.00
521.	Schedule O—Charitable, public, and similar gifts and bequests	521.	.00
522.	**Total deductions** (add lines 517 through 521) (Enter here and on part 2, line 2)	522.	.00

Part 6—Estate transfer tax table. See part 6 in the instructions for the tax table, computation instructions, and an example.

Include a copy of all required schedules and supporting documents. Mail to: See instructions. Addresses have changed.

REFERENCES

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ii. https://www.orcpa.org/news/5f01de82-5cc5-4781-b8ec-4ccfd2fff6b3:navigating-the-oregon-estate-tax-estate-planning-strategies-for-2024

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vi. Bakija, J., & Slemrod, J. (2004). Do the rich flee from high state taxes? Evidence from federal estate tax returns (NBER Working Paper No. 10645). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w10645/w10645.pdf

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viii. https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2023R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/260700

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x. Ibid